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Abstract—The Cloud computing paradigm is offering an
innovative and promising vision concerning the Information
and Communications Technology (ICT). Actually, it gives the
possibility of improving IT systems management and is changing
the way in which hardware and software are designed and
purchased. Notwithstanding, the use of Cloud resources, which
usually are external assets to their consumers, implies risk issues
that must be taken into account.
In this paper, we propose the involvement of risk management
procedures into Cloud computing. In this sense, we present a
Cloud computing risk management approach aware of Business-
Level Objectives (BLOs) of a given Cloud organization. More
to the point, we propose an innovatory SEmi-quantitative BLO-
driven Cloud Risk Assessment (SEBCRA) as the core subprocess
of this Cloud risk management approach.
In addition, we present, as a use case, a Cloud Service Provider
(CSP) that is able to improve the achievement of a given BLO,
i.e. profit maximization, by managing, assessing, and treating
Cloud-related risks. As demonstrated in the experimentation,
this provider maximizes its profit by transferring the risks of
provisioning its private Cloud, either under- or over-provisioning,
to third-party Cloud Infrastructure Providers (CIPs).
Index Terms—Cloud computing, Semi-quantitative Risk Man-
agement, Business-Level Objectives, Cloud Service Provider
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, Cloud computing is recognized as the most
promising computing paradigm of the last several years [1]. It
is already a reality and will be a sea change for the Information
and Communications Technology (ICT), by modifying the
way in which software and hardware are conceived and
purchased. This popularity has mainly come due to two of
its key capabilities: all computing needs are offered as a
service (commonly expressed as Everything-as-a-Service) and
the ability of dynamically provision computational resources.
Up to now, there are primarily two types of Cloud providers:
Cloud Service Providers (CSP) or either SaaS or PaaS
providers, e.g. Google App Engine [2], which offer Cloud
services over the Internet; and Cloud Infrastructure Providers
(CIP) or IaaS providers, e.g. Amazon EC2 [3], which provide
Cloud infrastructures (typically virtualized execution envi-
ronments) as a service and, thus, serve as the foundation
layer for Cloud systems. Actually, a lot of Cloud computing
models have arisen, each one offering different characteristics
or services, at different degrees of flexibility and involving
distinct risks. Given the fact that Cloud computing encom-
passes new technologies such as virtualization, there are both
new risks to be determined and old risks to be re-evaluated.
For these reasons, it is stringently necessary to introduce
risk management processes into the whole Cloud computing
domain. Generally, treatment of risks in Cloud environments
must be performed at service, data, and infrastructure layers.
Even beyond all these considerations, note that day-to-day
interactions between Cloud users and providers, as well as
between providers themselves, imply several trust and risk
issues, which must be addressed by the Cloud community
to ensure a successful growing of the paradigm. Actually,
Cloud providers and its users will always be exposed to hazard
events which can greatly reduce all Cloud computing benefits,
unless Cloud-related risks are addressed. The involvement of
risk-aware methods into Cloud systems is needed in order to
minimize unsung expenditures. Moreover, we also consider
the other side of the issue: risks that may result in a benefit
or positive impact for Cloud organizations. In this sense, a
remarkable tradeoff appears when considering the best action
to carry out for each risk.
Going further, and considering a scenario composed by
a CSP which interoperates with underlying CIPs in order
to consume resources from their public Clouds, risks due
to Cloud resources outsourcing (to these third-party CIPs)
are significant and they cannot be belittled. Even more, the
inclusion of risk management into CSP’s operation will lead
to an improvement in achieving its Business-Level Objectives
(BLOs), such as maximizing both its profit and the energy
efficiency of its private Cloud, among many others.
In this work, we contribute to the inclusion of risk man-
agement into the Cloud computing paradigm. In particular,
we propose a Cloud risk management process led by BLOs,
and a SEmi-quantitative BLO-driven Cloud Risk Assessment
(SEBCRA) as its core subprocess. All risk-aware actions
within these processes are oriented to address the impact
of Cloud-specific risks on these BLOs. Basically, they allow
any Cloud organization to be aware of Cloud risks and align
its low-level management decisions according to high-level
(business) objectives. Furthermore, we demonstrate, as a use
case, that a Cloud provider (i.e. CSP) is able to improve the
achievement of a significant variety of BLOs, by managing
and assessing those Cloud-related risks.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Risk Management and Assessment
According to the risk management standard of the Institute
of Risk Management (IRM) [4], a risk can be defined as
2the combination of the probability of an event and its con-
sequences (whether positive or negative) (based on ISO/IEC
Guide 73 [5]). In general, in all types of businesses there are
events which represent opportunities for benefit or threats to
success, i.e. positive and negative aspects of risks, respectively.
Thus, and in contrast to traditional risk avoidance strategies,
accepting some risks leads to obtain remarkable benefits.
The Risk Management, governed by principles and generic
guidelines established in ISO 31000:2009 [6], is the process
whereby organizations treat, in a methodical way, risks related
with their activities. The main goal is to obtain benefits and
sustainable values within each activity and across all of them.
Actually, it is a fundamental part of any organization’s strategic
management.
Entering in detail in its core subprocess, i.e. risk assessment,
there are three primary methods according to [7]: qualitative,
which uses simple calculations and thus it is not needed to
determine the numerical value of all assets at risk and threat
frequencies; quantitative, which assigns numerical values to
both impact and likelihood of risks; semi-quantitative (or
hybrid), which is less numerically intensive than quantitative
methods and classifies (prioritizes) risks according to con-
sequences and foreseen probabilities. Particularly, quantita-
tive risk assessments have been criticized for being overly
reductive and divert attention from preventive actions. In
addition, they ignore important qualitative differences among
risks. Although calculations involved are tedious and include
a strong element of arbitrariness, their main advantage is that
they provide accurate measurements of impacts’ magnitude.
However, these quantitative impacts may be unclear, thus
requiring to be interpreted in a qualitative way. Contrariwise,
the main advantage of a qualitative assessment is that it
prioritizes risks and identifies the most important areas for
improvement. Even so, it does not provide enough quantifiable
measurements concerning probabilities and impacts of risks.
As a result, semi-quantitative methods basically take profit
of both aforesaid advantages and, therefore, provide risk
prioritizations and useful quantifiable impacts analysis.
B. Cloud Computing Risks
Together with the surging of the Cloud computing paradigm,
several new risks have appeared. Within these new risks we
find specific issues imposed by law or regulations and a lot of
operational risks imposed due to using an external provider or
service. The Cloud community has to clearly identify Cloud-
specific risks and re-evaluate conventional ones. Further, Cloud
services, and not just providers, should be the subject of risk
management and assessment. Risks in Cloud environments
must be considered at service, data, and infrastructure layers.
Notice that the level of risk will, in many cases, vary signif-
icantly with the type of Cloud architecture being considered.
Moreover, it is possible for Cloud customers to transfer some
risks to external Cloud providers. In any case, we believe the
operation of Cloud services should be consistent with both
risk management strategies and BLOs.
According to [8], [9] and [10], the most important risks
introduced by Cloud computing are: SLAs breaches, ability
to adequately assess risks of a Cloud provider, responsibility
to protect sensitive data, virtualization-related risks, loss of
direct control of resources and software, compliance risks,
and decreased reliability since service providers may go out
of business, among others. On the contrary, there are some
traditional risks that must be re-evaluated. For instance, the
risk of network breaks is now more critical for Cloud organiza-
tions since they are totally based on the network. Furthermore,
other risks, such as natural disasters, must be considered in
a different way (because of the constantly use of external
resources) for ensuring high-availability of Cloud services.
In short, there is appearing a wide range of Cloud-specific
risks that must be well-identified and managed by the Cloud
community in the coming years. Hence, we need to include
risk management processes into Clouds and develop risk-
aware strategies, policies and heuristics required to face both
those Cloud risks and traditional ones that have changed.
III. RELATED WORK
The risk itself and its management have been considered
in a great amount of research fields, e.g. statistics, biology,
engineering and systems analysis, since many years ago.
Aven has made pioneer contributions for risk analysis and
management, such as [11]. Additionally, he has introduced the
concept of considering a risk as an event where the result is
uncertain, either positive and negative, [12]; and has stated
that semi-quantitative risk analysis replaces very well tedious
quantitative approaches [13].
Somewhat similar to our work, Yeo and Buyya [14] pose the
problem whether a resource management policy implemented
in the commercial computing service is capable of meeting the
required objectives or not. For that purpose, they develop two
evaluation methods to validate the effectiveness of resource
management policies in achieving the required objectives:
separate and integrated risk analysis. The experimentation
performed demonstrates the applicability and success of their
risk-based methods. Furthermore, in [15] and [16] the risk
of paying penalties to compensate service providers’ users is
minimized and, thus, they are able to increase the profit of
those providers.
Moreover, there are many research contributions toward
risk assessment that differ in the level of development of
methodology items. They are all grouped under the three risk
assessment methods: quantitative [17], which most of them
are based on Bayes’ theorem [18]; qualitative [19], and semi-
quantitative [13].
In addition, the risk has been widely tackled in other
successful distributed computing paradigm, i.e. Grid com-
puting. In this field, Djemame et al. have contributed with
a lot of research works (see for instance [20]) within the
context of the AssessGrid project [21]. As we propose in
this work focused on the Cloud, they have widely addressed
the inclusion and implementation of risk management and
assessment methods into Grid environments. In particular, they
treat risk-aware negotiations and SLAs, risk-based decision-
support for infrastructure management, and calculation of risk-
indicators for provider ranking and competition, among others.
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management and assessment methods are yet to be introduced
into the Cloud computing field of study and there are a lot of
open research issues.
IV. BLO-DRIVEN CLOUD RISK MANAGEMENT
In this section, we introduce a novel Cloud risk management
process driven by organization’s interests (i.e. BLOs). In
essence, it is designed to address impacts and consequences of
Cloud-specific risks into well-defined BLOs of a given Cloud
organization. In fact, it has the main goal of increasing the
probability of success and, thus, decreasing both the chance to
failure and the uncertainty in achieving organization’s BLOs.
In this direction, Cloud organization’s core operations will be
dynamically adapted by means of risk-aware scheduling and
policies.
As illustrated in Figure 1, our risk management proposal
is governed by organization’s BLOs and strategic objectives,
and is split in the following processes (based on the FERMA’s
Risk Management Standard [22]): SEBCRA (Risk Assessment),
which is basically the overall process of risk analysis and
evaluation (see next Section IV-A for a detailed explanation);
Risk Reporting and communication; Risk Treatment, which im-
plements and selects risk-aware policies, as well as measures,
actions, and controls to amend consequences of risks; and Risk
Monitoring where all the above steps are reviewed.
Business-Level Objectives
Risk Reporting
SEBCRA 
(Risk Assessment)
Risk Analysis
Risk Evaluation
Risk Mitigation
Risk Treatment
Risk Monitoring
Fig. 1. BLO-driven Cloud risk management steps.
A. SEmi-quantitative BLO-oriented Cloud Risk Assessment
Risk management literature commonly specifies the need
to rank and prioritize risks in order to identify areas for
immediate improvement and, thus, focus the best efforts on
threatening risks. In this sense, we present a new information
security risk assessment model, i.e. a SEmi-quantitative BLO-
oriented Cloud Risk Assessment (SEBCRA), which has the
known purpose of generating a ranking of Cloud risks. More-
over, the main difference with other risk assessment models
is that it evaluates the impact of Cloud-related risks on BLOs
considered, instead of considering effects on the whole Cloud
organization.
In fact, it is the core process of the BLO-driven Cloud
risk management and has Risk Level Estimations (RLEs) as
outputs, which are individually specified for each risk and
BLO affected. Generally, the whole assessment method is
subdivided into the risk analysis and its evaluation.
1) Risk Analysis: This is the step in which the probability of
risks and the magnitude of their consequences are determined.
We propose a semi-quantitative risk analysis, which uses a
standard risk level matrix in order to bring out risk level
estimations. Note that we have based these estimations on
ISO/IEC 27005:2008 [23]. We can divide risk analysis in
three stages: Risk identification, which establishes and defines
organization’s potential risks. It is perhaps the most difficult
aspect of managing risks, because more risks will happen in
the future than can be predicted today, i.e. the problem of
“unk-unks” (unknown unknowns) [24]; Risk description, that
is an essential step to guarantee a comprehensive risk assess-
ment method. Its objective is to show the previously identified
risks in a structured format; and Risk estimation, which figures
out the likelihood of occurrence and the estimated impact
on BLOs of each risk previously recognized. In particular,
the impact is considered in terms of threats (downside risks)
and opportunities (upside risks) and is usually evaluated using
a 3x3, 4x4 or 5x5 risk-level matrices, depending on the
granularity of risk assessment desired. Notice that we use a
10x5 matrix because we are considering five possibilities either
for positive and negative impacts, while standard matrices (e.g.
5x5) only consider the negative side.
Going into detail, we establish the following semi-
quantitative classifications: the probability of occurrence of
risk (Pi), expressed by means of: very unlikely - 0.1 (e.g.
once in 1000 years), unlikely - 0.25 (1 in 10 years), possible
- 0.5 (yearly), likely - 0.75 (monthly or weekly), and frequent
- 1.0 (e.g. at any moment); the impact of risk (Ii), either a
threat, a benefit, or both, semi-quantified between very high
(-100 or 100, for negative and positive impact, respectively),
high (-75/75), medium (-50/50), low (-25/25) and very low
(-10/10); the BLO affected by risk (Bi); and the Risk Level
Estimation (RLE), which is proportional to the probability of
a given risk and its impact on the BLO in question (Ii(Bi)),
resulting in the following equation:
RLEi(Bi) = Pi · Ii(Bi)
Notice that five levels of RLE are defined: critical if −100 ≤
RLE ≤ −50; unacceptable if−50 < RLE < −10; negligible
if −10 ≤ RLE ≤ 10; profitable if 10 < RLE < 50;
and high profitable if 50 ≤ RLE ≤ 100. Therefore, we
have to avoid risks with a RLE that is within the critical or
unacceptable range, and take advantage of risks that lead to an
improvement in the achievement of the BLOs considered. For
a better understanding, in Table I and Figure 2 we illustrate all
the possibilities concerning risk level estimations for a given
BLO in terms of ranges and numeric values, respectively. Note
that values given to Pi and Ii(Bi) are useful for assessing
resulting RLEi(Bi).
2) Risk Evaluation: In this step, it is needed to compare
risks levels estimated against a risk acceptance criterion, which
establish a threshold that determines the acceptability of risks.
4Probability Pi
Very unlikely (0.1) Unlikely (0.25) Possible (0.5) Likely (0.75) Frequent (1.0)
Impact Ii(Bi)
Very high (100) Negligible Profitable High profitable High profitable High profitable
High (75) Negligible Profitable Profitable High profitable High profitable
Benefit Medium (50) Negligible Profitable Profitable Profitable High profitable
Low (25) Negligible Negligible Profitable Profitable Profitable
Very low (10) Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible
Very low (-10) Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible
Low (-25) Negligible Negligible Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable
Threat Medium (-50) Negligible Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Critical
High (-75) Negligible Unacceptable Unacceptable Critical Critical
Very high (-100) Negligible Unacceptable Critical Critical Critical
TABLE I
RISK-LEVEL MATRIX (IN QUALITATIVE RANGES) OF SEBCRA ON BLOS.
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Fig. 2. Risk level estimations (in numeric values) of SEBCRA on BLOs.
In fact, the action of moving up and down this threshold
(i.e. risk acceptance criterion) is a serviceable practice to
determine the organization’s risking level. Really, this step
determines risk management priorities according to semi-
quantitative relationships between risks and their impacts.
B. Risk Reporting
Thereafter the SEBCRA method, the risk management
approach has to report, in a comprehensive manner for Cloud
organization’s executives, all results obtained in the assessment
subprocess. Its main goal is to bring risk analysis and eval-
uation back to the business core. Afterward, this information
is useful for rethinking high-level objectives according to the
constantly improved knowledge around risks.
C. Risk Treatment and Mitigation
Once risks has been identified, evaluated, and reported,
the Risk Treatment subprocess takes place. This involves the
definition of potential risk-aware actions, controls, and policies
to conduct an appropriate Risk Mitigation methodology, which
aims to move risks on the negligible or profitable levels. In this
sense, there are four possible responses to effectively deal with
each risk. Avoid the risk, by eliminating its cause(s). Reduce
the risk by taking steps to cut down its probability, its impact,
or both. Accept the risk and its related consequences. Transfer
or delegate the risk to external organizations.
Obviously, risks with a positive risk level will always be
‘accepted’. On the contrary, for negative risks, the organization
has the other three alternative responses. Future risks’ impacts
will depend vastly on these decisions taken.
D. Risk Monitoring
Finally, Risk Level Estimations predicted (RLEp), that the
organization expects to have after carrying out the risk
response decided in the previous step, are also reported.
Differences between RLE and RLEp are the motivation of
performing the whole risk management process and both are
inputs for the Risk Monitoring subprocess. This is the last part
of the whole management process and helps the organization
to know if the actions previously decided are correct or not
in managing each risk. Its main goal is to adapt any of the
previous subprocesses according to information gathered from
monitoring methods. In fact, monitoring information is very
important for a risk-aware self-management of Cloud services
driven by business-level objectives.
V. USE CASE: RISK MANAGEMENT IN A CLOUD SERVICE
PROVIDER
In this section, we present a Cloud Service Provider (CSP)
as a use case of the risk management procedure explained
above in Section IV.
A. CSP in Hybrid Cloud Scenario
We consider a scenario in which a CSP interoperates with
underlying CIPs. In this context, the CSP is the responsible
for operating, maintaining, and managing its private Cloud
(which is composed by its in-house virtualized resources) and
is able to outsource Cloud resources to public Clouds managed
by third-party CIPs. This outsourcing operation takes place
when the capacity of those in-house resources (i.e. the private
Cloud) of the CSP, are insufficient for Cloud services’ time-
varying demands. This environment composed by both public
and private Clouds is known as hybrid Cloud.
B. Risks and BLOs of the CSP
Firstly, we identify the most important risks to which the
CSP is exposed in the scenario considered.In particular, we
classify these risks into the following groups, depending on
the source of them:
51) Cloud capacity provisioning. We distinguish between
two types of risk, which are over- and under-
provisioning a given Cloud. Regarding the CSP, this
risk affects assets constituting its own private Cloud (see
Section V-E for further information).
2) Service Level Agreements, such as the risks of accepting
new Cloud service’s SLA, its violations due to poor
performance and service disruptions, etc.
3) Virtualization, i.e. those related with the underlying tech-
nology of Clouds, such as the risks of virtual machine
isolation or virtualization performance overhead.
4) Cloud applications data. In this case we consider the
risks of data integrity loss, destruction of data, etc.
5) Cloud resources outsourcing. Risks associated with the
loss of governance and hidden costs, among others.
6) Others. Here we group the risks of power loss to the IT
systems, natural disasters, fire, etc.
Secondly, since the SEBCRA procedure is oriented to the
impact of risks on BLOs, we specify the CSP’s BLOs consid-
ered at this moment: profit maximization (ProfMax), Quality
of Service maximization (QoSMax), energy efficiency maxi-
mization (EnEffMax), maximization of customers’ satisfaction
(SatMax), hazard events (threat risks) minimization (HazMin),
trust maximization (TrustMax), reliability maximization (Rel-
Max), and reputation maximization (RepMax). Evidently, some
other high-level objectives can be determined.
C. SEBCRA for Risk Assessment in a CSP
We want to demonstrate the feasibility of the SEBCRA
procedure to be used in a CSP. For this reason, we present
an example showing how different risks have distinct impacts
on the BLOs considered. For instance, the risks concerning
the provisioning of the CSP’s private Cloud have the impacts
on BLOs as described in Table II.
Risk i Bi
Ii(Bi) RLEi(Bi)Benefit Threat
HazMin 0 Very high Critical
EnEffMax 0 Very high Critical
ProfMax 0 Medium Critical
Over- RelMax Very Low 0 Negligible
prov. RepMax Very Low 0 Negligible
TrustMax Very Low 0 Negligible
QoSMax Very Low 0 Negligible
SatMax Very Low 0 Negligible
ProfMax 0 Very high Critical
HazMin 0 Very high Critical
RelMax 0 High Critical
Under- RepMax 0 High Critical
prov. TrustMax 0 High Critical
QoSMax 0 High Critical
SatMax 0 High Critical
EnEffMax Very low 0 Negligible
TABLE II
THE IMPACTS ON CSP’S BLOS OF THE RISKS OF PROVISIONING ITS
PRIVATE CLOUD.
On one hand, the risk of over-provisioning can appear at
any moment (probability of occurrence = frequent) and its
risk levels estimations are: critical for HazMin, EnEffMax and
ProfMax, because the exposure to hazard events increases, the
provider is consuming more energy than the strictly needed
and it pays for more resources than necessary, respectively;
and negligible for RelMax, RepMax, TrustMax, QoSMax and
SatMax, because this risk has almost no impact on these BLOs.
On the other hand, the risk of under-provisioning have the
same probability (frequent), but dissimilar impacts and BLOs
affected: critical for ProfMax, HazMin, RelMax, RepMax,
TrustMax, QoSMax and SatMax because the provider is not
able to meet with the QoS agreed in the SLA and thus,
clients’ satisfaction, QoS offered, and its reliability, reputation,
trust and total gain are clearly diminished; and negligible
for EnEffMax because, although the energy consumption is
many times less than the required by Cloud applications,
the under-provisioning technique does not incur significant
improvements in terms of energy efficiency.
D. SEBCRA for Profit Maximization in a CSP
In this section, we exemplify how the SEBCRA procedure
can be used to improve a given BLO, which is the profit
maximization of the provider in question. Notice that all risks
can have impact on many BLOs (as shown in Table II), but
in this case (Table III) we only present the consequences
on the ProfMax BLO. Moreover, all the key parameters
of the SEBCRA procedure are also identified in Table III.
After completing the table of probabilities and impacts, the
SEBCRA procedure helps the CSP in the tasks of categorizing
and prioritizing risks according to their importance to a given
BLO. In this sense, the CSP is able to put its best efforts for
addressing risks that may incur more benefit to the ProfMax
BLO in this case: the risks concerning the provisioning of its
private Cloud. Indeed, this SEBCRA procedure focused on
the profit maximization indicates that the CSP will be able to
move the RLEs of these risks from the ‘critical’ range to the
‘high profitable’, by transferring them to third-party CIPs.
It is noteworthy that this transference of risks is carried out
by outsourcing Cloud resources to public Clouds owned by
CIPs. In fact, these outsourcing operations are very suitable
in this scenario in order to maximize the total profit of the
CSP, but also may have important side effects that cannot
be overlooked. For instance, the probability of hazard events
during these outsourcing operations may be increased (for an
example see Section V-F).
As a result, this innovative SEBCRA procedure is very
convenient to be used by the CSP driven by BLOs. Basically,
the provider in question will be able to better align its BLOs
with the implemented resource management and policies
aware of risk probabilities, impacts, and level estimations.
Risk management strategies could be largely used to deal
with critical and unacceptable levels of risk. For instance, risk
avoidance for rejecting a new Cloud service and risk reduction,
by executing redundantly an application on different Cloud
resources, for minimizing the negative impact due to SLA
violations, service disruptions, and performance losses.
Going further, and depending on the priority of the provider
on each BLO, actions to be performed in order to address risks
will be different and, thus, the impact of those (either a benefit
and/or threat) will also be dissimilar.
6Riski Probability (Pi)
Impact RLEi(Bi) Action(s)
Consequences RLEp(Bi)Benefit Threat Benefit Threat
Under-provisioning Frequent 0 Very High Critical Transfer Very high 0 High profit.
Over-provisioning Frequent 0 Medium Critical Transfer Very high 0 High profit.
Accept new Cloud Service Likely High Low Profitable Accept / Avoid Very high 0 High profit.
SLA violations Likely Very low Medium Unacceptable Reduce / Avoid 0 Very low Negligible
Service disruptions Possible 0 Medium Unacceptable Reduce / Avoid 0 Very low Negligible
Performance loss Possible 0 Medium Unacceptable Reduce / Avoid 0 Very low Negligible
Outsourcing hidden costs Unlikely 0 High Unacceptable Avoid 0 Very low Negligible
VM isolation Very unlikely 0 High Negligible Accept 0 High Negligible
Virt. performance overhead Very unlikely 0 High Negligible Accept 0 High Negligible
Data integrity loss Very unlikely 0 Medium Negligible Accept 0 Medium Negligible
Destruction of data Very unlikely 0 Medium Negligible Accept 0 Medium Negligible
Loss of governance Very unlikely 0 Medium Negligible Accept 0 Medium Negligible
Power loss of IT systems Very unlikely 0 Very low Negligible Accept 0 Very low Negligible
Natural disasters, fire, etc. Very unlikely 0 Very low Negligible Accept 0 Very low Negligible
TABLE III
USE OF SEBCRA PROCEDURE FOR PROFIT MAXIMIZATION (PROFMAX) OF THE CLOUD SERVICE PROVIDER.
E. Transferring the Risks of Private Cloud Provisioning to
CIPs
As shown in Figure 3, an over-provisioning strategy implies
that servers are underutilized in low demand situations, with
the corresponding energetic, economic, and administration ex-
penditures. On the other side, an under-provisioned datacenter,
the provider will not pay so much for these costs. However,
it will lose part of clients as it is not able to attend peak
demands. In addition, although one thinks that has all the
needed resources capacity for the estimated peak demand, a
wrong estimation can be made or some unexpected demands
due to sudden events could appear (e.g. slashdot effect).
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Fig. 3. Cloud provisioning strategies.
The afore-mentioned outsourcing operation to public Clouds
allows the CSP to transfer these critical risks, i.e. the risks of
provisioning the private Cloud of the CSP, to third-party CIPs.
Actually, the outsourcing operation is performed implicitly by
the Cloud elasticity method and takes place when a CSP needs
to scale up the Cloud infrastructure. It is carried out when
Cloud services’ demands overcome resources capacity of the
private Cloud managed by the CSP itself.
As a matter of fact, the CSP is able to obtain remarkable
benefits by transferring the risks of provisioning its private
Cloud, as well as using the Cloud elasticity capability and
the Cloud resources outsourcing. Within economic benefits
we observe the direct consequence of maximizing its profit.
Moreover we can highlight, for instance, the maximization of
customers’ satisfaction and CSP’s reputation. Generally, the
provider does not have to necessarily make a great investment
for its private datacenter or do any capacity planning.
F. Risk of Service Disruptions
The risk of service disruptions increases implicitly when
performing outsourcing operations to external CIPs. Hereto-
fore, Cloud providers, either of infrastructures (resources) or
services, exhibit a lack of proper and suitable Service Level
Agreements (SLAs) or, simply, only low-level parameters are
included in them, such as the availability of the corresponding
Cloud service. For instance, Amazon Web Services, the most
successful CIP of nowadays, only provides simple guarantees
in the SLAs for its offered services, that are Amazon Elastic
Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) [25] and Amazon Simple
Storage Service (Amazon S3) [26]. Particularly, only the
availability (expressed as the annual uptime percentage) of
these Cloud services is defined in those SLAs: 99.95% and
99.9% for EC2 and S3 services, respectively. Notice that
Amazon pays a penalty equal to 10% of the monthly bill for
the EC2 service if the availability is less than the agreed in the
SLA, and 10% or 25% of the monthly bill for the S3 service
if the availability is equal or greater than 99% but less than
99.9%, or if it is less than 99%, respectively.
Using these SLAs, any Cloud provider is able to manage
the risk of service disruptions and consider its acceptability by
using both the availability parameter and associated penalties
determined in SLAs. Nevertheless, and due to the absence of
complete SLAs, the CSP is not still able to cope with many
other risks involved in the hybrid scenario considered (see
Section V-B for a description of them).
Actually, we are currently working on the integration of
the CSP presented herein with different CIPs. The future
combination of both this integration with multiple CIPs and
suitable SLAs definition from those CIPs will allow the CSP
to use the risk management process in order to implement
policies that assess in the decision of which is the best CIP to
outsource for each Cloud service offered. Probably, the ‘best’
CIP will be simply the one with lower risk or another one
with an assumable risk and offering better other significant
parameters like ecological efficiency, prices, reputation, loy-
alty, and security. Notice that these additional parameters must
be considered throughout the risk assessment methodology.
In addition, historical information about previous agreements
carried out with external CIPs will be very useful.
7VI. EXPERIMENTATION
In this section, we present the experimentation which
demonstrates the benefits achieved by the CSP by incorpo-
rating the BLO-driven risk management into its operation.
A. Experimental Environment
We use Apache Tomcat v5.5 with the hybrid architec-
ture [27] as the back-end web servers of the CSP. All of them
are encapsulated into virtualized and isolated Cloud resources
with one processor unit and 512MB of memory available
for the server. Moreover, we use Squid [28] as the proxy
server for load balancing among the available web servers
(either local or outsourced), and EMOTIVE [29] as the third-
party CIP. We have deployed the SPECweb2009 [30] banking
web application. It is based on Internet personal banking
and, consequently, all clients’ requests are through the SSL
protocol. All the machines used are connected through 1 Gbps
Ethernet and run Xen 3.3.1 over Linux kernel 2.6.18.
1) Workload: The workload pattern was obtained from a
European ISP (its name cannot be disclosed) and is the typical
received by current web applications during a whole day. It
has been produced using Httperf [31] (instead SPECweb2009
client emulator) because it allows to make more configurable
and variable tests. Workload requests generated by Httperf
were extracted from an exhaustive characterization of the
SPECweb2009 client emulator. All tests lasted one day.
2) SLA economic parameters: For this experimentation,
we have used the following economic parameters, which are
specified in SLAs agreed with clients: a Price of 1e per
hour, which is the amount of money that the clients pays
to the CSP for deploying and managing the associated web
application; Cost of Cloud resources (with 1 processor unit
and 512MB of memory) of 0.18e/h and 0.15e/h for in-
house and outsourced resources, respectively; and changeable
Penalties for the provider. Note that these penalties depend on
two parameters that determine the degree of SLA violations,
namely the total amount of time with an SLA violation, and the
magnitude of this violation (see [32] for further information).
B. CSP Profit Maximization
Figure 4 shows, from top to bottom, the variable input
load pattern, the number of back-end web servers, and the
instantaneous profit earned by three different CSPs: risk-
aware, which uses the SEBCRA procedure and, thus, consid-
ers the transference to a third-party CIP (EMOTIVE) of the
risks of provisioning its private Cloud; and the two possible
cases without using any risk assessment procedure, i.e. under-
provisioned and over-provisioned private Cloud.
The final profits in these three cases are the following:
21.84e/day for the risk-aware, 8.0304e/day for the under-
provisioned strategy and 19.68e/day for the over-provisioned.
Notice that the loss in earnings in the over-provisioning case
is due to the fact of paying at all time the maximum amount of
Cloud resources needed for attending the highest peak demand
(three in this case). In the under-provisioning case, the provider
does not pay for so many resources (in fact, only for one), but
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Fig. 4. CSP profit with a one-day typical workload.
the penalties due to SLA violations are very high because
the amount of Cloud resources used is not aligned with the
application’s resources needs (shown in the second subfigure
of Figure 4). On the contrary, the risk-aware CSP dynamically
adapts the number of back-end servers used. In this sense, the
first server is running on in-house resources, while the other
ones, needed to attend service’s peak demand, are outsourced.
Regarding the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) [33] of the trans-
ference of these risks to third-party CIPs, we can clearly
determine that its cost is 0.15e for each Cloud resource
outsourced. Hence, the maximum possible gain is precisely
the achieved by the risk-aware CSP (21.84e). The consider-
ation of other threats and risks that appear implicitly when
performing outsourcing operations are out of the scope of
this paper. Therefore, we can conclude the real economic loss
due to each risk: 63.23% and 9.89% for the under- and over-
provisioned strategies, respectively. Furthermore, the RLEs of
these risks to the ProfMax BLO provided by the SEBCRA
procedure
(
RLEunder−prov.(ProfMax) = very high threat and
RLEover−prov.(ProfMax) = medium threat
)
(see Table III) are
clearly representative.
Additionally, the fact of being unaware of these risks has
some remarkable side effects. The under-provisioned strategy
leads to lower customers’ satisfaction due to the poor QoS
offered in some periods of time, as well as diminished
CSP’s reliability and reputation. On the other side, the over-
provisioned situation decreases greatly the energy efficiency.
As a result, the CSP is able to achieve the maximum
profit (91% of the price paid by clients) by considering the
transference of these risks to external CIPs, while achieving,
at the same time, the maximization of other significant BLOs
like energy efficiency, QoS offered, clients’ satisfaction, and
its reputation and reliability. However, outsourcing operations,
needed to perform the transference of risks to outside CIPs,
imply also the increasing of the exposure to risks due to this
externalization, such as the loss of governance, the appearance
of hidden costs and service disruptions from these third-party
providers. For these reasons, and depending on provider’s
interests, is not always beneficial to perform these outsourcing
operations.
8VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have introduced risk management into the
Cloud computing paradigm. In this direction, we firstly expose
the most important Cloud-specific risks and those for which a
Cloud Service Provider is exposed. Afterward, we have pre-
sented a Cloud-specific risks management procedure oriented
to determine the risk impact (either positive or negative) on
BLOs. In addition, we have proposed the SEmi-quantitative
BLO-oriented Cloud Risk Assessment (SEBCRA) procedure,
which is the key process of the whole risk management pro-
cess. Its main goal is to analyze Cloud risks and, consequently,
prioritize them according to their impact on different BLOs. It
introduces a methodology that brings transparency to making-
decision processes that are based on risk.
Furthermore, we have demonstrated how each risk may
have dissimilar repercussions for each BLO considered. As a
use case, we have presented a CSP that is able to improve
the achievement of a given BLO, i.e. profit maximization.
After performing the SEBCRA method in this direction, we
have observed that the most impacting risks on this BLO
are those concerning the provisioning of the CSP’s private
Cloud. Finally, the results obtained from the experimentation
conducted have confirmed that the CSP is able to maximize
its profit by transferring these risks to third-party CIPs.
A. Future Work
Our future work includes the completion of the BLO-driven
Cloud risk management introduced herein. Its integration into
a Cloud management framework needs the implementation
of an autonomic risk-aware scheduler, which will be based
on business-driven policies and heuristics that help the CSP
to improve its reliability. Moreover, it will assist in deciding
which third-party CIP to choose depending on CSP’s BLOs,
Cloud service’s requirements, and CIPs’ dependability. In
addition, we are pondering the inclusion of the ALARP (As
Low As Reasonably Practicable) principle [34] into the risk
analysis subprocess of the SEBCRA method. Basically, a risk
is within the ALARP range if the cost needed to reduce it
is greatly disproportionate to the benefit gained. In fact, this
consideration involves a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) [33].
Another important issue will be the tackling of scenarios
where multiple BLOs are defined by Cloud organizations. In
this cases, several trade-offs appears and, therefore, complex
business-driven management policies need to be developed.
Finally, we will carefully treat all the other Cloud-specific
risks named in Section II-B. We will go toward the incorpo-
ration of risk-related parameters into SLAs. The CSP would
perform risk estimations prior to SLA negotiation with the aim
of well-establishing SLAs key attributes (i.e. price, penalties,
etc.). Afterward, the Cloud service would only be deployed
if those SLA’s parameters and the corresponding risks are
acceptable for the CSP.
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